diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/IO')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/IO/ssl.c | 1105 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/IO/ssl.h | 47 |
2 files changed, 1152 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/IO/ssl.c b/src/IO/ssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c21960c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/IO/ssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,1105 @@ +/* + * File: ssl.c + * + * Copyright 2004 Garrett Kajmowicz <gkajmowi@tbaytel.net> + * (for some bits derived from the https dpi, e.g., certificate handling) + * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, + * 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * (for the certificate hostname checking from wget) + * Copyright (C) 2011 Benjamin Johnson <obeythepenguin@users.sourceforge.net> + * (for the https code offered from dplus browser that formed the basis...) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * As a special exception, permission is granted to link Dillo with the OpenSSL + * project's "OpenSSL" library, and distribute the linked executables, without + * including the source code for OpenSSL in the source distribution. You must + * obey the GNU General Public License, version 3, in all respects for all of + * the code used other than "OpenSSL". + */ + +/* https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMyClient.html */ + +/* + * Using TLS in Applications: http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/uta/documents/ + * TLS: http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/documents/ + */ + +#include "config.h" +#include "../msg.h" + +#ifndef ENABLE_SSL + +void a_Ssl_init() +{ + MSG("SSL: Disabled at compilation time.\n"); +} + +#else + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> + +#include <ctype.h> /* tolower for wget stuff */ +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include "../../dlib/dlib.h" +#include "../dialog.hh" +#include "../klist.h" +#include "iowatch.hh" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "Url.h" + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> /* for hostname checking */ + +#define CERT_STATUS_NONE 0 +#define CERT_STATUS_RECEIVING 1 +#define CERT_STATUS_GOOD 2 +#define CERT_STATUS_BAD 3 +#define CERT_STATUS_USER_ACCEPTED 4 + +typedef struct { + char *hostname; + int port; + int cert_status; +} Server_t; + +typedef struct { + int fd; + int connkey; +} FdMapEntry_t; + +/* + * Data type for SSL connection information + */ +typedef struct { + int fd; + DilloUrl *url; + SSL *ssl; + bool_t connecting; +} Conn_t; + +/* List of active SSL connections */ +static Klist_t *conn_list = NULL; + +/* + * If ssl_context is still NULL, this corresponds to SSL being disabled. + */ +static SSL_CTX *ssl_context; +static Dlist *servers; +static Dlist *fd_map; + +static void Ssl_connect_cb(int fd, void *vssl); + +/* + * Compare by FD. + */ +static int Ssl_fd_map_cmp(const void *v1, const void *v2) +{ + int fd = VOIDP2INT(v2); + const FdMapEntry_t *e = v1; + + return (fd != e->fd); +} + +static void Ssl_fd_map_add_entry(int fd, int connkey) +{ + FdMapEntry_t *e = dNew0(FdMapEntry_t, 1); + e->fd = fd; + e->connkey = connkey; + + if (dList_find_custom(fd_map, INT2VOIDP(e->fd), Ssl_fd_map_cmp)) { + MSG_ERR("SSL FD ENTRY ALREADY FOUND FOR %d\n", e->fd); + assert(0); + } + + dList_append(fd_map, e); +//MSG("ADD ENTRY %d %s\n", e->fd, URL_STR(sd->url)); +} + +/* + * Remove and free entry from fd_map. + */ +static void Ssl_fd_map_remove_entry(int fd) +{ + void *data = dList_find_custom(fd_map, INT2VOIDP(fd), Ssl_fd_map_cmp); + +//MSG("REMOVE ENTRY %d\n", fd); + if (data) { + dList_remove_fast(fd_map, data); + dFree(data); + } else { + MSG("SSL FD ENTRY NOT FOUND FOR %d\n", fd); + } +} + +/* + * Return SSL connection information for a given file + * descriptor, or NULL if no SSL connection was found. + */ +void *a_Ssl_connection(int fd) +{ + Conn_t *conn; + + if (fd_map) { + FdMapEntry_t *fme = dList_find_custom(fd_map, INT2VOIDP(fd), + Ssl_fd_map_cmp); + + if (fme && (conn = a_Klist_get_data(conn_list, fme->connkey))) + return conn; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Add a new SSL connection information node. + */ +static int Ssl_conn_new(int fd, const DilloUrl *url, SSL *ssl) +{ + int key; + + Conn_t *conn = dNew0(Conn_t, 1); + conn->fd = fd; + conn->url = a_Url_dup(url); + conn->ssl = ssl; + conn->connecting = TRUE; + + key = a_Klist_insert(&conn_list, conn); + + Ssl_fd_map_add_entry(fd, key); + + return key; +} + +/* + * Let's monitor for ssl alerts. + */ +static void Ssl_info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret) +{ + if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { + MSG("SSL ALERT on %s: %s\n", (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write", + SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); + } +} + +/* + * Load trusted certificates. + * This is like using SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() but permitting more + * than one bundle and more than one directory. Due to the notoriously + * abysmal openssl documentation, this was worked out from reading discussion + * on the web and then reading openssl source to see what it normally does. + */ +static void Ssl_load_certificates() +{ + /* curl-7.37.1 says that the following bundle locations are used on "Debian + * systems", "Redhat and Mandriva", "old(er) Redhat", "FreeBSD", and + * "OpenBSD", respectively -- and that the /etc/ssl/certs/ path is needed on + * "SUSE". No doubt it's all changed some over time, but this gives us + * something to work with. + */ + uint_t u; + char *userpath; + static const char *ca_files[] = { + "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt", + "/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt", + "/usr/share/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt", + "/usr/local/share/certs/ca-root.crt", + "/etc/ssl/cert.pem", + CA_CERTS_FILE + }; + + static const char *ca_paths[] = { + "/etc/ssl/certs/", + CA_CERTS_DIR + }; + + X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_context); + X509_LOOKUP *lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); + + for (u = 0; u < sizeof(ca_files) / sizeof(ca_files[0]); u++) { + if (*ca_files[u]) + X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, ca_files[u], X509_FILETYPE_PEM); + } + + lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); + for (u = 0; u < sizeof(ca_paths)/sizeof(ca_paths[0]); u++) { + if (*ca_paths[u]) + X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, ca_paths[u], X509_FILETYPE_PEM); + } + + userpath = dStrconcat(dGethomedir(), "/.dillo/certs/", NULL); + X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, userpath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); + dFree(userpath); + + /* Clear out errors in the queue (file not found, etc.) */ + while(ERR_get_error()) + ; +} + +/* + * Initialize the OpenSSL library. + */ +void a_Ssl_init(void) +{ + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + if (RAND_status() != 1) { + /* The standard solution is to provide it with more entropy, but this + * involves knowing very well that you are doing exactly the right thing. + */ + MSG_ERR("Disabling HTTPS: Insufficient entropy for openssl.\n"); + return; + } + + /* Create SSL context */ + ssl_context = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); + if (ssl_context == NULL) { + MSG_ERR("Disabling HTTPS: Error creating SSL context.\n"); + return; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ssl_context, Ssl_info_cb); + + /* Don't want: eNULL, which has no encryption; aNULL, which has no + * authentication; LOW, which as of 2014 use 64 or 56-bit encryption; + * EXPORT40, which uses 40-bit encryption; RC4, for which methods were + * found in 2013 to defeat it somewhat too easily. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ssl_context, + "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!EXPORT40:!RC4"); + + /* SSL2 has been known to be insecure forever, disabling SSL3 is in response + * to POODLE, and disabling compression is in response to CRIME. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_context, + SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); + + /* This lets us deal with self-signed certificates */ + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_context, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); + + Ssl_load_certificates(); + + fd_map = dList_new(20); + servers = dList_new(8); +} + +/* + * Save certificate with a hashed filename. + * Return: 0 on success, 1 on failure. + */ +static int Ssl_save_certificate_home(X509 * cert) +{ + char buf[4096]; + + FILE * fp = NULL; + uint_t i = 0; + int ret = 1; + + /* Attempt to create .dillo/certs blindly - check later */ + snprintf(buf, 4096, "%s/.dillo/", dGethomedir()); + mkdir(buf, 01777); + snprintf(buf, 4096, "%s/.dillo/certs/", dGethomedir()); + mkdir(buf, 01777); + + do { + snprintf(buf, 4096, "%s/.dillo/certs/%lx.%u", + dGethomedir(), X509_subject_name_hash(cert), i); + + fp=fopen(buf, "r"); + if (fp == NULL){ + /* File name doesn't exist so we can use it safely */ + fp=fopen(buf, "w"); + if (fp == NULL){ + MSG("Unable to open cert save file in home dir\n"); + break; + } else { + PEM_write_X509(fp, cert); + fclose(fp); + MSG("Wrote certificate\n"); + ret = 0; + break; + } + } else { + fclose(fp); + } + i++; + /* Don't loop too many times - just give up */ + } while (i < 1024); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Test whether a URL corresponds to a server. + */ +static int Ssl_servers_cmp(const void *v1, const void *v2) +{ + Server_t *s = (Server_t *)v1; + const DilloUrl *url = (const DilloUrl *)v2; + const char *host = URL_HOST(url); + int port = URL_PORT(url); + + return (dStrAsciiCasecmp(s->hostname, host) || (port != s->port)); +} + +/* + * The purpose here is to permit a single initial connection to a server. + * Once we have the certificate, know whether we like it -- and whether the + * user accepts it -- HTTP can run through queued sockets as normal. + * + * Return: 1 means yes, 0 means not yet, -1 means never. + * TODO: Something clearer or different. + */ +int a_Ssl_connect_ready(const DilloUrl *url) +{ + Server_t *s; + int i, len; + const char *host = URL_HOST(url); + const int port = URL_PORT(url); + int ret = SSL_CONNECT_READY; + + dReturn_val_if_fail(ssl_context, SSL_CONNECT_NEVER); + + len = dList_length(servers); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + s = dList_nth_data(servers, i); + + if (!dStrAsciiCasecmp(s->hostname, host) && (port == s->port)) { + if (s->cert_status == CERT_STATUS_RECEIVING) + ret = SSL_CONNECT_NOT_YET; + else if (s->cert_status == CERT_STATUS_BAD) + ret = SSL_CONNECT_NEVER; + + if (s->cert_status == CERT_STATUS_NONE) + s->cert_status = CERT_STATUS_RECEIVING; + return ret; + } + } + s = dNew(Server_t, 1); + + s->port = port; + s->hostname = dStrdup(host); + s->cert_status = CERT_STATUS_RECEIVING; + dList_append(servers, s); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Did we find problems with the certificate, and did the user proceed to + * reject the connection? + */ +static int Ssl_user_said_no(const DilloUrl *url) +{ + Server_t *s = dList_find_custom(servers, url, Ssl_servers_cmp); + + if (!s) + return FALSE; + + return s->cert_status == CERT_STATUS_BAD; +} + +/* + * Did we find problems with the certificate, and did the user proceed to + * accept the connection anyway? + */ +static int Ssl_user_said_yes(const DilloUrl *url) +{ + Server_t *s = dList_find_custom(servers, url, Ssl_servers_cmp); + + if (!s) + return FALSE; + + return s->cert_status == CERT_STATUS_USER_ACCEPTED; +} + +/******************** BEGINNING OF STUFF DERIVED FROM wget-1.16.3 */ + +#define ASTERISK_EXCLUDES_DOT /* mandated by rfc2818 */ + +/* Return true is STRING (case-insensitively) matches PATTERN, false + otherwise. The recognized wildcard character is "*", which matches + any character in STRING except ".". Any number of the "*" wildcard + may be present in the pattern. + + This is used to match of hosts as indicated in rfc2818: "Names may + contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any + single domain name component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com + matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but + not bar.com [or foo.bar.com]." + + If the pattern contain no wildcards, pattern_match(a, b) is + equivalent to !strcasecmp(a, b). */ + +static bool_t pattern_match (const char *pattern, const char *string) +{ + + const char *p = pattern, *n = string; + char c; + for (; (c = tolower (*p++)) != '\0'; n++) + if (c == '*') + { + for (c = tolower (*p); c == '*'; c = tolower (*++p)) + ; + for (; *n != '\0'; n++) + if (tolower (*n) == c && pattern_match (p, n)) + return TRUE; +#ifdef ASTERISK_EXCLUDES_DOT + else if (*n == '.') + return FALSE; +#endif + return c == '\0'; + } + else + { + if (c != tolower (*n)) + return FALSE; + } + return *n == '\0'; +} + +static bool_t Ssl_check_cert_hostname(X509 *cert, const DilloUrl *url, int *choice) +{ + dReturn_val_if_fail(cert && url, -1); + + char *msg; + const char *host = URL_HOST(url); + GENERAL_NAMES *subjectAltNames; + bool_t success = TRUE, alt_name_checked = FALSE;; + char common_name[256]; + + /* Check that HOST matches the common name in the certificate. + #### The following remains to be done: + + - When matching against common names, it should loop over all + common names and choose the most specific one, i.e. the last + one, not the first one, which the current code picks. + + - Ensure that ASN1 strings from the certificate are encoded as + UTF-8 which can be meaningfully compared to HOST. */ + + subjectAltNames = X509_get_ext_d2i (cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); + + if (subjectAltNames) + { + /* Test subject alternative names */ + + /* Do we want to check for dNSNAmes or ipAddresses (see RFC 2818)? + * Signal it by host_in_octet_string. */ + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *host_in_octet_string = a2i_IPADDRESS (host); + + int numaltnames = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num (subjectAltNames); + int i; + for (i=0; i < numaltnames; i++) + { + const GENERAL_NAME *name = + sk_GENERAL_NAME_value (subjectAltNames, i); + if (name) + { + if (host_in_octet_string) + { + if (name->type == GEN_IPADD) + { + /* Check for ipAddress */ + /* TODO: Should we convert between IPv4-mapped IPv6 + * addresses and IPv4 addresses? */ + alt_name_checked = TRUE; + if (!ASN1_STRING_cmp (host_in_octet_string, + name->d.iPAddress)) + break; + } + } + else if (name->type == GEN_DNS) + { + /* dNSName should be IA5String (i.e. ASCII), however who + * does trust CA? Convert it into UTF-8 for sure. */ + unsigned char *name_in_utf8 = NULL; + + /* Check for dNSName */ + alt_name_checked = TRUE; + + if (0 <= ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&name_in_utf8, name->d.dNSName)) + { + /* Compare and check for NULL attack in ASN1_STRING */ + if (pattern_match ((char *)name_in_utf8, host) && + (strlen ((char *)name_in_utf8) == + (size_t)ASN1_STRING_length (name->d.dNSName))) + { + OPENSSL_free (name_in_utf8); + break; + } + OPENSSL_free (name_in_utf8); + } + } + } + } + sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(subjectAltNames, GENERAL_NAME_free); + if (host_in_octet_string) + ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(host_in_octet_string); + + if (alt_name_checked == TRUE && i >= numaltnames) + { + success = FALSE; + msg = dStrconcat("no certificate subject alternative name matches" + " requested host name \n", host, NULL); + *choice = a_Dialog_choice("Dillo SSL", + msg, "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + dFree(msg); + + switch (*choice){ + case 1: + success = TRUE; + break; + case 2: + break; + default: + break; + } + } + } + + if (alt_name_checked == FALSE) + { + /* Test commomName */ + X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(cert); + common_name[0] = '\0'; + X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, common_name, + sizeof (common_name)); + + if (!pattern_match (common_name, host)) + { + success = FALSE; + msg = dStrconcat("certificate common name ", common_name, " doesn't match requested host name ", host, NULL); + *choice = a_Dialog_choice("Dillo SSL", + msg, "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + dFree(msg); + + switch (*choice){ + case 1: + success = TRUE; + break; + case 2: + break; + default: + break; + } + } + else + { + /* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it + * differs from common_name's length, then there is a \0 + * before the string terminates. This can be an instance of a + * null-prefix attack. + * + * https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike + * */ + + int i = -1, j; + X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry; + ASN1_STRING *sdata; + + if (xname) { + for (;;) + { + j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i); + if (j == -1) break; + i = j; + } + } + + xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i); + sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry); + if (strlen (common_name) != (size_t)ASN1_STRING_length (sdata)) + { + success = FALSE; + msg = dStrconcat("certificate common name is invalid (contains a NUL character). This may be an indication that the host is not who it claims to be -- that is, not the real ", host, NULL); + *choice = a_Dialog_choice("Dillo SSL", + msg, "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + dFree(msg); + + switch (*choice){ + case 1: + success = TRUE; + break; + case 2: + break; + default: + break; + } + } + } + } + return success; +} + +/******************** END OF STUFF DERIVED FROM wget-1.16.3 */ + +/* + * Examine the certificate, and, if problems are detected, ask the user what + * to do. + * Return: -1 if connection should be canceled, or 0 if it should continue. + */ +static int Ssl_examine_certificate(SSL *ssl, const DilloUrl *url) +{ + X509 *remote_cert; + long st; + char buf[4096], *cn, *msg; + int choice = -1, ret = -1; + char *title = dStrconcat("Dillo SSL: ", URL_HOST(url), NULL); + Server_t *srv = dList_find_custom(servers, url, Ssl_servers_cmp); + + remote_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); + if (remote_cert == NULL){ + /* Inform user that remote system cannot be trusted */ + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "The remote system is not presenting a certificate.\n" + "This site cannot be trusted. Sending data is not safe.", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + + /* Abort on anything but "Continue" */ + if (choice == 1){ + ret = 0; + } + + } else if (Ssl_check_cert_hostname(remote_cert, url, &choice)) { + /* Figure out if (and why) the remote system can't be trusted */ + st = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); + switch (st) { + case X509_V_OK: + ret = 0; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + /* Either self signed and untrusted */ + /* Extract CN from certificate name information */ + if ((cn = strstr(remote_cert->name, "/CN=")) == NULL) { + strcpy(buf, "(no CN given)"); + } else { + char *cn_end; + + cn += 4; + + if ((cn_end = strstr(cn, "/")) == NULL ) + cn_end = cn + strlen(cn); + + strncpy(buf, cn, (size_t) (cn_end - cn)); + buf[cn_end - cn] = '\0'; + } + msg = dStrconcat("The remote certificate is self-signed and " + "untrusted.\nFor address: ", buf, NULL); + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + msg, "Continue", "Cancel", "Save Certificate", NULL); + dFree(msg); + + switch (choice){ + case 1: + ret = 0; + break; + case 2: + break; + case 3: + /* Save certificate to a file here and recheck the chain */ + /* Potential security problems because we are writing + * to the filesystem */ + Ssl_save_certificate_home(remote_cert); + ret = 1; + break; + default: + break; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "The issuer for the remote certificate cannot be found\n" + "The authenticity of the remote certificate cannot be trusted", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "The remote certificate signature could not be read\n" + "or is invalid and should not be trusted", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "Part of the remote certificate is not yet valid\n" + "Certificates usually have a range of dates over which\n" + "they are to be considered valid, and the certificate\n" + "presented has a starting validity after today's date\n" + "You should be cautious about using this site", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "The remote certificate has expired. The certificate\n" + "wasn't designed to last this long. You should avoid \n" + "this site.", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "There was an error in the certificate presented.\n" + "Some of the certificate data was improperly formatted\n" + "making it impossible to determine if the certificate\n" + "is valid. You should not trust this certificate.", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: + case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "One of the certificates in the chain is being used\n" + "incorrectly (possibly due to configuration problems\n" + "with the remote system. The connection should not\n" + "be trusted", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "Some of the information presented by the remote system\n" + "does not match other information presented\n" + "This may be an attempt to eavesdrop on communications", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "Self signed certificate in certificate chain. The certificate " + "chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the " + "root could not be found locally.", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + "Unable to get local issuer certificate. The issuer certificate " + "of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.", + "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + if (choice == 1) { + ret = 0; + } + break; + default: /* Need to add more options later */ + snprintf(buf, 80, + "The remote certificate cannot be verified (code %ld)", st); + choice = a_Dialog_choice(title, + buf, "Continue", "Cancel", NULL); + /* abort on anything but "Continue" */ + if (choice == 1){ + ret = 0; + } + } + X509_free(remote_cert); + remote_cert = 0; + } + dFree(title); + + if (choice == 2) + srv->cert_status = CERT_STATUS_BAD; + else if (choice == -1) + srv->cert_status = CERT_STATUS_GOOD; + else + srv->cert_status = CERT_STATUS_USER_ACCEPTED; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * If the connection was closed before we got the certificate, we need to + * reset state so that we'll try again. + */ +void a_Ssl_reset_server_state(const DilloUrl *url) +{ + if (servers) { + Server_t *s = dList_find_custom(servers, url, Ssl_servers_cmp); + + if (s && s->cert_status == CERT_STATUS_RECEIVING) + s->cert_status = CERT_STATUS_NONE; + } +} + +/* + * Close an open SSL connection. + */ +static void Ssl_close_by_key(int connkey) +{ + Conn_t *c; + + if ((c = a_Klist_get_data(conn_list, connkey))) { + a_Ssl_reset_server_state(c->url); + if (c->connecting) { + a_IOwatch_remove_fd(c->fd, -1); + dClose(c->fd); + } + SSL_shutdown(c->ssl); + SSL_free(c->ssl); + + a_Url_free(c->url); + Ssl_fd_map_remove_entry(c->fd); + a_Klist_remove(conn_list, connkey); + dFree(c); + } +} + +/* + * Connect, set a callback if it's still not completed. If completed, check + * the certificate and report back to http. + */ +static void Ssl_connect(int fd, int connkey) +{ + int ret; + bool_t ongoing = FALSE, failed = TRUE; + Conn_t *conn; + + if (!(conn = a_Klist_get_data(conn_list, connkey))) { + MSG("Ssl_connect: conn for fd %d not valid\n", fd); + return; + } + + assert(!ERR_get_error()); + + ret = SSL_connect(conn->ssl); + + if (ret <= 0) { + int err1_ret = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, ret); + if (err1_ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ || + err1_ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { + int want = err1_ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ ? DIO_READ : DIO_WRITE; + + _MSG("iowatching fd %d for ssl -- want %s\n", fd, + err1_ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ ? "read" : "write"); + a_IOwatch_remove_fd(fd, -1); + a_IOwatch_add_fd(fd, want, Ssl_connect_cb, INT2VOIDP(connkey)); + ongoing = TRUE; + failed = FALSE; + } else if (err1_ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL || err1_ret == SSL_ERROR_SSL) { + unsigned long err2_ret = ERR_get_error(); + + if (err2_ret) { + do { + MSG("SSL_connect() failed: %s\n", + ERR_error_string(err2_ret, NULL)); + } while ((err2_ret = ERR_get_error())); + } else { + /* nothing in the error queue */ + if (ret == 0) { + MSG("SSL connect error: \"an EOF was observed that violates " + "the protocol\"\n"); + /* + * I presume we took too long on our side and the server grew + * impatient. + */ + } else if (ret == -1) { + MSG("SSL connect error: %s\n", dStrerror(errno)); + + /* If the following can happen, I'll add code to handle it, but + * I don't want to add code blindly if it isn't getting used + */ + assert(errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR); + } else { + MSG_ERR("According to the man page for SSL_get_error(), this " + "was not a possibility (ret %d).\n", ret); + } + } + } else { + MSG("SSL_get_error() returned %d on a connect.\n", err1_ret); + } + } else { + if (Ssl_user_said_yes(conn->url) || + (Ssl_examine_certificate(conn->ssl, conn->url) != -1)) + failed = FALSE; + } + + /* + * If there were problems with the certificate, the connection may have + * been closed by the server if the user responded too slowly to a popup. + */ + + if (!ongoing) { + if (a_Klist_get_data(conn_list, connkey)) { + conn->connecting = FALSE; + if (failed) { + Ssl_close_by_key(connkey); + } + a_IOwatch_remove_fd(fd, DIO_READ|DIO_WRITE); + a_Http_connect_done(fd, failed ? FALSE : TRUE); + } else { + MSG("Connection disappeared. Too long with a popup popped up?\n"); + } + } +} + +static void Ssl_connect_cb(int fd, void *vconnkey) +{ + Ssl_connect(fd, VOIDP2INT(vconnkey)); +} + +/* + * Perform the SSL handshake on an open socket. + */ +void a_Ssl_handshake(int fd, const DilloUrl *url) +{ + SSL *ssl; + bool_t success = TRUE; + int connkey = -1; + + if (!ssl_context) + success = FALSE; + + if (success && Ssl_user_said_no(url)) { + success = FALSE; + } + + assert(!ERR_get_error()); + + if (success && !(ssl = SSL_new(ssl_context))) { + unsigned long err_ret = ERR_get_error(); + do { + MSG("SSL_new() failed: %s\n", ERR_error_string(err_ret, NULL)); + } while ((err_ret = ERR_get_error())); + success = FALSE; + } + + /* assign SSL connection to this file descriptor */ + if (success && !SSL_set_fd(ssl, fd)) { + unsigned long err_ret = ERR_get_error(); + do { + MSG("SSL_set_fd() failed: %s\n", ERR_error_string(err_ret, NULL)); + } while ((err_ret = ERR_get_error())); + success = FALSE; + } + + if (success) + connkey = Ssl_conn_new(fd, url, ssl); + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME + /* Server Name Indication. From the openssl changelog, it looks like this + * came along in 2010. + */ + if (success && !a_Url_host_is_ip(URL_HOST(url))) + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, URL_HOST(url)); +#endif + + if (!success) { + a_Ssl_reset_server_state(url); + a_Http_connect_done(fd, success); + } else { + Ssl_connect(fd, connkey); + } +} + +/* + * Read data from an open SSL connection. + */ +int a_Ssl_read(void *conn, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + Conn_t *c = (Conn_t*)conn; + return SSL_read(c->ssl, buf, len); +} + +/* + * Write data to an open SSL connection. + */ +int a_Ssl_write(void *conn, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + Conn_t *c = (Conn_t*)conn; + return SSL_write(c->ssl, buf, len); +} + +void a_Ssl_close_by_fd(int fd) +{ + FdMapEntry_t *fme = dList_find_custom(fd_map, INT2VOIDP(fd), + Ssl_fd_map_cmp); + + if (fme) { + Ssl_close_by_key(fme->connkey); + } +} + +static void Ssl_servers_freeall() +{ + if (servers) { + Server_t *s; + int i, n = dList_length(servers); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + s = (Server_t *) dList_nth_data(servers, i); + dFree(s->hostname); + dFree(s); + } + dList_free(servers); + } +} + +static void Ssl_fd_map_remove_all() +{ + if (fd_map) { + FdMapEntry_t *fme; + int i, n = dList_length(fd_map); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + fme = (FdMapEntry_t *) dList_nth_data(fd_map, i); + dFree(fme); + } + dList_free(fd_map); + } +} + +/* + * Clean up the OpenSSL library + */ +void a_Ssl_freeall(void) +{ + if (ssl_context) + SSL_CTX_free(ssl_context); + Ssl_fd_map_remove_all(); + Ssl_servers_freeall(); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ diff --git a/src/IO/ssl.h b/src/IO/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f55479b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/IO/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#ifndef __SSL_H__ +#define __SSL_H__ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "../url.h" + +#define SSL_CONNECT_NEVER -1 +#define SSL_CONNECT_NOT_YET 0 +#define SSL_CONNECT_READY 1 + +void a_Ssl_init(); + + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL +int a_Ssl_connect_ready(const DilloUrl *url); +void a_Ssl_reset_server_state(const DilloUrl *url); + +/* Use to initiate a SSL connection. */ +void a_Ssl_handshake(int fd, const DilloUrl *url); + +void *a_Ssl_connection(int fd); + +void a_Ssl_freeall(); + +void a_Ssl_close_by_fd(int fd); +int a_Ssl_read(void *conn, void *buf, size_t len); +int a_Ssl_write(void *conn, void *buf, size_t len); +#else + +#define a_Ssl_connect_ready(url) SSL_CONNECT_NEVER +#define a_Ssl_reset_server_state(url) ; +#define a_Ssl_handshake(fd, url) ; +#define a_Ssl_connection(fd) NULL +#define a_Ssl_freeall() ; +#define a_Ssl_close_by_fd(fd) ; +#define a_Ssl_read(conn, buf, len) 0 +#define a_Ssl_write(conn, buf, len) 0 +#endif +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* __SSL_H__ */ + |